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Abstract
Bribery in elections is an important problem in computational social choice theory. We in-
troduce and study two important special cases of the classical $BRIBERY problem, namely,
FRUGAL-BRIBERY and FRUGAL-$BRIBERY where the briber is frugal in nature. By this, we
mean that the briber is only able to influence voters who benefit from the suggestion of
the briber. More formally, a voter is vulnerable if the outcome of the election improves
according to her own preference when she accepts the suggestion of the briber. In the
FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem, the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by
changing only the vulnerable votes. In the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem, the vulnerable
votes have prices and the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by changing
only the vulnerable votes, subject to a budget constraint. We further formulate two nat-
ural variants of the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem namely UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY and
NONUNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY where the prices of the vulnerable votes are, respectively,
all the same or different. The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem turns out to be a special case of
sophisticated $BRIBERY as well as SWAP-BRIBERY problems. Whereas the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY
problem turns out to be a special case of the $BRIBERY problem.
We show that the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is polynomial time solvable for the k-
approval, k-veto, and plurality with run off voting rules for unweighted elections. These
results establish success in finding practically appealing as well as polynomial time solv-
able special cases of the sophisticated $BRIBERY and SWAP-BRIBERY problems. On the other
hand, we show that the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the Borda voting rule
and the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for most of the voting rules studied
here barring the plurality and the veto voting rules for unweighted elections. Our hard-
ness results of the FRUGAL-BRIBERY and the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problems thus subsumes
and strengthens the hardness results of the $BRIBERY problem from the literature. For
the weighted elections, we show that the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for all
the voting rules studied here except the plurality voting rule even when the number of
candidates is as low as 3 (for the STV and the plurality with run off voting rules) or 4
(for the maximin, the Copelandα with α ∈ [0, 1), and the simplified Bucklin voting rules).
In our view, the fact that the simplest FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem becomes computationally
intractable for many important voting rules (except the plurality voting rule) even with
Preprint submitted to Theoretical Computer Science March 1, 2017
very few candidates is surprising as well as interesting.
Keywords: Computational social choice; voting; bribery; frugal; manipulation; algorithm;
theory.
1. Introduction
In a typical voting scenario, we have a set of candidates and a set of voters reporting
their preferences or votes which are complete rankings over the candidates. A voting rule is
a procedure that, given a collection of votes, chooses one candidate as the winner. A set of
votes over a set of candidates along with a voting rule is called an election.
Activities that try to influence voter opinions, in favor of specific candidates, are very
common during the time that an election is in progress. For example, in a political election,
candidates often conduct elaborate campaigns to promote themselves among a general or
targeted audience. Similarly, it is not uncommon for people to protest against, or rally
for, a national committee or court that is in the process of approving a particular policy.
An extreme illustration of this phenomenon is bribery — here, the candidates may create
financial incentives to sway the voters. Of course, the process of influencing voters may
involve costs even without the bribery aspect; for instance, a typical political campaign or
rally entails considerable expenditure.
All situations involving a systematic attempt to influence voters usually have the fol-
lowing aspects: an external agent, a candidate that the agent would like to be the winner,
a budget constraint, a cost model for a change of vote, and knowledge of the existing
election. The formal computational problem that arises from these inputs is the follow-
ing: is it possible to make a distinguished candidate win the election in question by in-
curring a cost that is within the budget? This question, with origins in Faliszewski et
al. [FHH06, FHH09, FHHR09], has been subsequently studied intensely in computational
social choice literature. In particular, bribery has been studied under various cost mod-
els, for example, uniform price per vote which is known as $BRIBERY [FHH06], nonuni-
form price per vote [Fal08], nonuniform price per shift of the distinguished candidate per
vote which is called SHIFT BRIBERY, nonuniform price per swap of candidates per vote
which is called SWAP BRIBERY [EFS09a]. A closely related problem known as campaign-
ing has been studied for various vote models, for example, truncated ballots [BFLR12],
soft constraints [PRV13], CP-nets [DK15], combinatorial domains [MPVR12] and proba-
bilistic lobbying [BEF+14]. The bribery problem has also been studied under voting rule
uncertainty [EHH14]. Faliszewski et al. [FRRS14] study the complexity of bribery in sim-
plified Bucklin and Fallback voting rules. Xia [Xia12] studies destructive bribery, where the
goal of the briber is to change the winner by changing minimum number of votes. Dorn
et al. [DS12] studies the parameterized complexity of the SWAP BRIBERY problem and
Bredereck et al. [BCF+14] explores the parameterized complexity of the SHIFT BRIBERY
problem for a wide range of parameters. We recall again that the costs and the budgets in-
volved in all the bribery problems above need not necessarily correspond to actual money
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traded between voters and candidates. They may correspond to any cost in general, for
example, the amount of effort or time that the briber needs to spend for each voter.
1.1. Motivation
In this work, we propose an effective cost model for the bribery problem. Even the most
general cost models that have been studied in the literature fix absolute costs per voter-
candidate combination, with no specific consideration to the voters’ opinions about the
current winner and the distinguished candidate whom the briber wants to be the winner.
In our proposed model, a change of vote is relatively easier to effect if the change causes an
outcome that the voter would find desirable. Indeed, if the currently winning candidate is,
say, a, and a voter is (truthfully) promised that by changing her vote from c ≻ d ≻ a ≻ b
to d ≻ b ≻ c ≻ a, the winner of the election would change from a to d, then this is a
change that the voter is likely to be happy to make. While the change does not make her
most favorite candidate win the election, it does improve the result from her point of view.
Thus, given the circumstances (namely that of her least favorite candidate winning the
election), the altered vote serves the voter better than the original one.
We believe this perspective of voter influence is an important one to study. The cost of
a change of vote is proportional to the nature of the outcome that the change promises —
the cost is low or nil if the change results in a better outcome with respect to the voter’s
original ranking, and high or infinity otherwise. A frugal agent only approaches voters of
the former category, thus being able to effectively bribe with minimal or no cost. Indeed
the behavior of agents in real life is often frugal. For example, consider campaigners in
favor of a relatively smaller party in a political election. They may actually target only
vulnerable voters due to lack of human and other resources they have at their disposal.
More formally, let c be the winner of an election and p (other than c) the candidate
whom the briber wishes to make the winner of the election. Now the voters who prefer
c to p will be reluctant to change their votes, and we call these votes non-vulnerable with
respect to p— we do not allow these votes to be changed by the briber, which justifies the
frugal nature of the briber. On the other hand, if a voter prefers p to c, then it may be very
easy to convince her to change her vote if doing so makes p win the election. We name
these votes vulnerable with respect to p. When the candidate p is clear from the context,
we simply call these votes non-vulnerable and vulnerable, respectively.
The computational problem is to determine whether there is a way to make a candidate
p win the election by changing only those votes that are vulnerable with respect to p. We
call this problem FRUGAL-BRIBERY. Note that there is no cost involved in the FRUGAL-
BRIBERY problem— the briber does not incur any cost to change the votes of the vulnerable
votes. We also extend this basic model to a more general setting where each vulnerable
vote has a certain nonnegative integer price which may correspond to the effort involved in
approaching these voters and convincing them to change their votes. We also allow for the
specification of a budget constraint, which can be used to enforce auxiliary constraints.
This leads us to define the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem, where we are required to find a
subset of vulnerable votes with a total cost that is within a given budget, such that these
votes can be changed in some way to make the candidate p win the election. Note that the
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FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem can be either uniform or nonuniform depending on whether
the prices of the vulnerable votes are all identical or different. If not mentioned otherwise,
the prices of the vulnerable votes will be assumed to be nonuniform. We remind that the
briber is not allowed to change the non-vulnerable votes in both the FRUGAL-BRIBERY and
the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problems.
1.2. Contributions
Our primary contribution in this paper is to formulate and study two important and
natural models of bribery which turn out to be special cases of the well studied $BRIBERY
problem in elections. Indeed, the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem and, more importantly,
the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem are very restricted yet practically appealing cases of the
$BRIBERY problem.
Our Results for Unweighted Elections
We have the following polynomial time algorithms for unweighted elections. These re-
sults show that the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is computationally tractable for some voting
rules for which the $BRIBERY problem is NP-complete as observed for the k-approval with
k > 3 [Lin11], simplified Bucklin [FRRS15]. We summarize the results in Table 1.
– The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is in P for the k-approval, simplified Bucklin, and
plurality with runoff voting rules. Also, the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is in P for the
plurality and veto voting rules.
– The FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is in P for the k-approval, simplified Bucklin, and
plurality with runoff voting rules when the budget is a constant [Theorem 4].
We have the following intractability results for the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem and the
FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem for unweighted elections. Our hardness results of the FRUGAL-
BRIBERY and the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problems below thus subsume and strengthen the hard-
ness results of the $BRIBERY problem from the literature.
– The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the Borda voting rule [Theorem 1].
The FRUGAL-$BRIBERY is NP-complete for the k-approval for any constant k > 5 [The-
orem 2], k-veto for any constant k > 3 [Theorem 3], and a wide class of scoring rules
[Theorem 5] even if the price of every vulnerable vote is either 1 or ∞. Moreover,
the UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY is NP-complete for the Borda voting rule even if all
the vulnerable votes have a uniform price of 1 and the budget is 2 [Theorem 6].
– The FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the Borda, maximin, Copeland,
and STV voting rules [Observation 3].
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Our Results for Weighted Elections
We have the following results for weighted elections. We observe that, barring a few
exceptions, even the most restrictive FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is NP-complete even when
we have only 3 or 4 candidates.
– The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is in P for the maximin and Copeland voting rules
when we have only 3 candidates [Observation 4], and for the plurality voting rule
for any number of candidates [Theorem 7].
– The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the STV [Theorem 10], plurality
with runoff [Corollary 1], and every scoring rule except the plurality voting rule
[Observation 5] for 3 candidates. The FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for
the plurality voting rule for 3 candidates [Theorem 8].
– When we have only 4 candidates, the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for
the maximin [Theorem 9], simplified Bucklin [Theorem 12], and Copeland [Theo-
rem 11] rules.
1.3. Related Work
The pioneering work of Faliszewski et al. [FHH06] defined and studied the $BRIBERY
problemwherein, the input is a set of votes with prices for each vote and the goal is to make
some distinguished candidate win the election, subject to a budget constraint of the briber.
The FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is the $BRIBERY problem with the restriction that the price
of every non-vulnerable vote is infinite. Also, the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is a special
case of the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem. Hence, whenever the $BRIBERY problem is compu-
tationally easy in a setting, both the FRUGAL-BRIBERY and the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problems
are also computationally easy (see Proposition 1 for a more formal proof). However, the
$BRIBERY problem is computationally intractable in most of the settings. This makes the
study of important special cases such as FRUGAL-BRIBERY and FRUGAL-$BRIBERY, inter-
esting. Elkind et al.[EFS09b] introduced and studied the SWAP-BRIBERY problem where
we have a more sophisticated cost model specifying cost of swapping every pair of can-
didates for every vote. It turns out that the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is a special case of
the SWAP-BRIBERY problem (see Proposition 3 for a formal proof). We note that a notion
similar to vulnerable votes has been studied in the context of dominating manipulation by
Conitzer et al. [CWX11]. Hazon et al. [HLK13] introduced and studied PERSUASION and
k-PERSUASION problems for the plurality, veto, k-approval, Bucklin, and Borda voting rules
in unweighted elections only. In the PERSUASION and k-PERSUASION problems an external
agent suggests votes to vulnerable voters which are beneficial for the vulnerable voters
as well as the external agent. It turns out that the PERSUASION and the k-PERSUASION
problems Turing reduce to the FRUGAL-BRIBERY and the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problems re-
spectively (see Proposition 4). Therefore, the polynomial time algorithms we propose in
this work imply polynomial time algorithms for the persuasion analog. On the other hand,
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Voting Rules
Unweighted Weighted
FRUGAL-BRIBERY FRUGAL-$BRIBERY FRUGAL-BRIBERY FRUGAL-$BRIBERY
Plurality
P
[Observation 1]
P
[Observation 2]
P
[Theorem 7]
NP-complete
[Theorem 8]
Veto
P
[Observation 1]
P
[Observation 2]
NP-complete
[Observation 5]
NP-complete
[Observation 5]
k-approval
P
[Observation 1]
NP-complete⋆
[Theorem 2]
NP-complete⋄
[Observation 5]
NP-complete
[Observation 5]
k-veto
P
[Observation 1]
NP-complete⋆
[Theorem 3]
NP-complete⋄
[Observation 5]
NP-complete
[Observation 5]
Borda
NP-complete
[Theorem 1]
NP-complete†
[Theorem 5]
NP-complete
[Observation 5]
NP-complete
[Observation 5]
Runoff
P
[Observation 1]
?
NP-complete
[Corollary 1]
NP-complete
[Corollary 1]
Maximin ?
NP-complete
[Observation 3]
NP-complete
[Theorem 9]
NP-complete
[Theorem 9]
Copeland ?
NP-complete
[Observation 3]
NP-complete
[Theorem 11]
NP-complete
[Theorem 11]
STV ?
NP-complete
[Observation 3]
NP-complete
[Theorem 10]
NP-complete
[Theorem 10]
Table 1: ⋆- The result holds for k > 3. †- The result holds for a much wider class of scoring rules. ⋄- The
results do not hold for the plurality voting rule. ?- The problem is open.
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since the reduction in Proposition 4 from PERSUASION to FRUGAL-BRIBERY is a Turing re-
duction, the existing NP-completeness results for the persuasion problems do not imply
NP-completeness results for the corresponding frugal bribery variants. We refer to the
book by Rogers [RR67] for Turing reductions.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first establish the setup
and general notions in Section 2. Next we present our results for unweighted elections
in Section 3 and our results for the weighted elections Section 4. Finally we conclude in
Section 5. A Preliminary version of this work appeared at AAAI-16 [DMN16a].
2. Preliminaries
Let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be the set of all voters and C = {c1, . . . , cm} the set of all candidates.
Each voter vi’s vote is a preference ≻i over the candidates which is a linear order over C. For
example, for two candidates a and b, a ≻i b means that the voter vi prefers a to b. Let ≻
be a vote over C, x ∈ C be a candidate, and k be a positive integer. We say that x is placed
at the kth position in the vote ≻ if there are exactly k − 1 candidates in C \ {x} who are
preferred over x in ≻; that is, |{y ∈ C\{x} : y ≻ x}| = k−1. We say that x is placed at the top
or the first position of ≻ if x is preferred over every other candidate y ∈ C\{x}. We say that
x is placed at the bottom or the last position of ≻ if every candidate y ∈ C\{x} other than x
is preferred over x in ≻. We say that x is placed at the kth position from the bottom or the
last position if x is preferred over exactly k− 1 candidates y ∈ C \ {x} other than x; that is,
|{y ∈ C \ {x} : x ≻ y} = k − 1|. In this paper, whenever we do not specify the order among
a set of candidates while describing a vote, the statement/proof is correct in whichever
way we fix the order among them. We denote the set {0, 1, 2, . . .} by N, N \ {0} by N+, and
{1, . . . , k} by [k], for any positive integer k. We denote the set of all linear orders over C by
L(C). Hence, L(C)
n
denotes the set of all n-voters’ preference profiles ≻[n]= (≻1, . . . ,≻n).
Let ⊎ denote the disjoint union of sets. A map rc : ⊎n,|C|∈N+L(C)
n −→ 2C \ {∅} is called a
voting correspondence. A map t : 2C \ {∅} −→ C is called a tie breaking rule. A commonly
used tie breaking rule is the lexicographic tie breaking rule where ties are broken according
to a predetermined preference ≻t∈ L(C). A voting rule is r = t ◦ rc, where ◦ denotes the
composition of maps.
Remark. We note that, in the literature, the definition of a voting rule is usually defined
as what we are referring to as a voting correspondence in the above. In particular, the
tie-breaking rule is often left out from the definition. We choose to only deal with vot-
ing rules that lead to unique winners by definition, because of our notion of vulnerable
votes. However, the notion of vulnerable votes can be generalized in natural ways (say, for
instance, that a vote is vulnerable if it prefers the desired candidate over all the current
winners; or at least one of them). As long as we require p to be the unique winner of the
bribed profile, our proofs will carry over to the more general setting. We use tie-breaking
rules mostly for ease of presentation.
In many settings, the voters may have positive integer weights. Such an election is
called a weighted election. The winner of a weighted election is defined to be the winner
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of the unweighted election where each vote is replaced by as many copies of the vote as its
weight. We remark that for all the voting rules studied here, the winner of any weighted
election can be computed in polynomial amount of time. We assume the elections to be
unweighted, if not stated otherwise. Given an election E, we can construct a directed
weighted graph GE, called the weighted majority graph, from E. The set of vertices in GE
is the set of candidates in E. For any two candidates x and y, the weight of the edge
(x,y) is DE(x,y) = NE(x,y) − NE(y, x), where NE(a,b) is the number of voters who
prefer candidate a to b. A candidate x is called the Condorcet winner in an election E if
DE(x,y) > 0 for every other candidate y 6= x. A voting rule is called Condorcet consistent
if it selects the Condorcet winner as the winner of the election whenever it exists. Some
examples of common voting correspondences are as follows.
– Positional scoring rules: A collection of m-dimensional vectors −→sm =
(α1,α2, . . . ,αm) ∈ R
m with α1 > α2 > . . . > αm and α1 > αm for every m ∈ N
naturally defines a voting rule — a candidate gets score αi from a vote if it is placed
at the ith position, and the score of a candidate is the sum of the scores it receives
from all the votes. The winners are the candidates with maximum score. Scoring
rules remain unchanged if we multiply every αi by any constant λ > 0 and/or add
any constant µ. Hence, we assume without loss of generality that for any score vector
−→sm, there exists a j such that αj − αj+1 = 1 and αk = 0 for all k > j. We call such a
−→sm a normalized score vector.
If αi is 1 for i ∈ [k] and 0 otherwise, then, we get the k-approval voting rule. For the
k-veto voting rule, αi is 0 for i ∈ [m − k] and −1 otherwise. 1-approval is called the
plurality voting rule and 1-veto is called the veto voting rule. If αi = m − i for every
i ∈ [m], then we get the Borda voting rule.
– Maximin: The maximin score of a candidate x is miny 6=xDE(x,y). The winners are
the candidates with maximum maximin score.
– Copelandα: Given α ∈ [0, 1], the Copelandα score of a candidate x is |{y 6= x :
DE(x,y) > 0}| + α|{y 6= x : DE(x,y) = 0}|. The winners are the candidates with
maximum Copelandα score. If not mentioned otherwise, we will assume α to be
zero.
– Simplified Bucklin: A candidate x’s simplified Bucklin score is the minimum number
ℓ such that more than half of the voters rank x in their top ℓ positions. The winners
are the candidates with lowest simplified Bucklin score.
– Plurality with runoff: The top two candidates according to the plurality scores are
selected first. The pairwise winner of these two candidates is selected as the winner.
This rule is often called the runoff voting rule.
– Single Transferable Vote: In Single Transferable Vote (STV), a candidate with the
least plurality score is dropped from the election and its votes are transferred to the
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next preferred candidate. If two or more candidates receive the least plurality score,
then a tie breaking rule is used. The candidate that remains after (m − 1) rounds is
the winner.
Among the above voting correspondences along with any arbitrary lexicographic tie-
breaking rule, only the maximin and the Copeland voting rules are Condorcet consistent.
We use the notationA 6P B to denote that the problemA polynomial time many-to-one
reduces to the problem B.
2.1. Problem Definition
In all the definitions below, r is a fixed voting rule. We define the notion of vulnerable
votes as follows. Intuitively, the vulnerable votes are those votes whose voters can easily
be persuaded to change their votes since doing so will result in an outcome that those
voters prefer over the current one.
Definition 1. (Vulnerable votes)
Given a voting rule r, a set of candidates C, a profile of votes ≻= (≻1, . . . ,≻n), and a distin-
guished candidate p, we say a vote ≻i is p-vulnerable if p ≻i r(≻).
Recall that, whenever the distinguished candidate is clear from the context, we drop it
from the notation. With the above definition of vulnerable votes, we formally define the
FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem as follows. Intuitively, the problem is to determine whether a
particular candidate can be made winner by changing only the vulnerable votes.
r-FRUGAL-BRIBERY
Input: A set C of candidates, a preference profile ≻= (≻1, . . . ,≻n) over C, and a candidate
p.
Question: Is there a way to make p win the election according to the voting rule r by
changing only the p-vulnerable votes?
We denote an arbitrary instance of r-FRUGAL-BRIBERY by (C,≻,p). Next we generalize
the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem to the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem which involves prices for
the vulnerable votes and a budget for the briber. Intuitively, the price of a vulnerable vote
v is the cost the briber incurs to change the vote v.
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r-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY
Input: A set C of candidates, a preference profile ≻= (≻1, . . . ,≻n) over C, a candidate p,
a finite budget b ∈ N, and a price function c : [n] −→ N ∪ {∞} such that c(i) = ∞ if ≻i is
not a p-vulnerable vote.
Question: Do there exist p-vulnerable votes ≻i1 , . . . ,≻iℓ∈≻ and votes ≻
′
i1
, . . . ,≻′iℓ∈ L(C)
such that:
(a) the total cost of the chosen votes is within the budget, that is,
∑ℓ
j=1 c(ij) 6 b, and
(b) the new votes make the desired candidate win according to the voting rule r, that is,
r(≻[n]\{i1,...,iℓ},≻
′
i1
, . . . ,≻′iℓ) = p.
The special case of the problem when the prices of all the vulnerable votes are the same
is called UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY. We refer to the general version as NONUNIFORM-
FRUGAL-$BRIBERY. If not specified, FRUGAL-$BRIBERY refers to the nonuniform version. We
denote an arbitrary instance of r-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY by (C,≻,p, c(·)). The above problems
are important special cases of the well studied $BRIBERY problem. Also, the COALITIONAL-
MANIPULATION problem [BTT89, CSL07], one of the classic problems in computational
social choice theory, turns out to be a special case of the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem [see
Proposition 1]. For the sake of completeness, we include the definitions of these problems
here.
r-$BRIBERY [FHH09]
Input: A set C of candidates, a preference profile ≻= (≻1, . . . ,≻n) over C, a candidate p,
a price function c : [n] −→ N ∪ {∞}, and a budget b ∈ N.
Question: Do there exist votes ≻i1 , . . . ,≻iℓ∈≻ and votes ≻
′
i1
, . . . ,≻′iℓ∈ L(C) such that:
(a) the total cost of the chosen votes is within the budget, that is,
∑ℓ
j=1 c(ij) 6 b, and
(b) the new votes make the desired candidate win according to the voting rule r, that is,
r(≻[n]\{i1,...,iℓ},≻
′
i1
, . . . ,≻′iℓ) = p.
r-COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION [BTT89, CSL07]
Input: A set C of candidates, a preference profile ≻t= (≻1, . . . ,≻n) of truthful voters over
C, an integer ℓ encoded in unary, and a distinguished candidate p.
Question: Does there exist an ℓ voter preference profile ≻ℓ such that the candidate p wins
uniquely (does not tie with any other candidate) in the profile (≻t,≻ℓ) according to the
voting rule r?
The following proposition shows relations among the above problems. Proposition 1,
2 and 4 below hold for both weighted and unweighted elections.
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Proposition 1. For every voting rule, FRUGAL-BRIBERY 6P UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY
6P NONUNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY 6P $BRIBERY. Also, COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION
6P NONUNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY.
Proof. In the reductions below, let us assume that the election to start with is a weighted
election. Since we do not change the weights of any vote in the reduction and since there
is a natural one to one correspondence between the votes of the original instance and the
reduced instance, the proof also works for unweighted elections.
Given a FRUGAL-BRIBERY instance, we construct a UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY instance
by defining the price of every vulnerable vote to be zero and the budget to be zero.
Clearly, the two instances are equivalent. Hence, FRUGAL-BRIBERY 6P UNIFORM-FRUGAL-
$BRIBERY.
UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY 6P NONUNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY 6P $BRIBERY fol-
lows from the fact that UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY is a special case of NONUNIFORM-
FRUGAL-$BRIBERY which in turn is a special case of $BRIBERY.
Given a COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION instance, we construct a NONUNIFORM-FRUGAL-
$BRIBERY instance as follows. Let p be the distinguished candidate of the manipulators
and ≻f= p ≻ others be any arbitrary but fixed ordering of the candidates given in the
COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION instance. Without loss of generality, we can assume that p
does not win if all the manipulators vote ≻f (Since this is a polynomially checkable case
of COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION). We define the vote of the manipulators to be ≻f, the
distinguished candidate of the campaigner to be p, the budget of the campaigner to be
zero, the price of the manipulators to be zero (notice that all the manipulators’ votes are
p-vulnerable), and the price of the rest of the vulnerable votes to be one. Clearly, the two
instances are equivalent. Hence, COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION 6P NONUNIFORM-FRUGAL-
$BRIBERY.
Also, the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem reduces to the COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION prob-
lem by simply making all vulnerable votes to be manipulators.
Proposition 2. For every voting rule, FRUGAL-BRIBERY 6P COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION.
The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem also reduces to the SWAP-BRIBERY problem as proved
below.
Proposition 3. For every voting rule, FRUGAL-BRIBERY 6P SWAP-BRIBERY.
Proof. Given an arbitrary instance of the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem, we define the SWAP-
BRIBERY instance simply by defining the cost of every swap in vulnerable votes to be 0, the
cost of every swap in non-vulnerable votes to be 1, and the budget to be 0.
We can also establish the following relation between the PERSUASION (respectively k-
PERSUASION) problem and the FRUGAL-BRIBERY (respectively FRUGAL-$BRIBERY) problem.
The persuasions differ from the corresponding frugal bribery variants in that the briber has
her own preference order, and desires to improve the outcome of the election with respect
to her preference order. The following proposition is immediate from the definitions of the
problems.
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Proposition 4. For every voting rule, there is a Turing reduction from PERSUASION (respec-
tively k-PERSUASION) to FRUGAL-BRIBERY (respectively FRUGAL-$BRIBERY).
Proof. Given an algorithm for the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem, we iterate over all possible
distinguished candidates to have an algorithm for the persuasion problem.
Given an algorithm for the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem, we iterate over all possible
distinguished candidates and fix the price of the corresponding vulnerables to be one to
have an algorithm for the k-persuasion problem.
3. Results for Unweighted Elections
Now we present the results for unweighted elections. We begin with some easy obser-
vations that follow from known results.
Observation 1. The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is in P for the k-approval voting rule for any
k, simplified Bucklin, and plurality with runoff voting rules.
Proof. The COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION problem is in P for these voting rules [XZP+09].
Hence, the result follows from Proposition 2.
Observation 2. The FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is in P for the plurality and veto voting rules.
Proof. The $BRIBERY problem is in P for the plurality [FHH06] and veto [Fal08] voting
rules. Hence, the result follows from Proposition 1.
Observation 3. The FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for Borda, maximin,
Copeland, and STV voting rules.
Proof. The COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION problem is NP-complete for the above voting
rules. Hence, the result follows from Proposition 1.
We now present our main results. We begin with showing that the FRUGAL-BRIBERY
problem for the Borda voting rule. To this end, we reduce from the PERMUTATION SUM
problem, which is known to be NP-complete [YHL04]. The PERMUTATION SUM problem is
defined as follows.
PERMUTATION SUM
Input: n integers Xi, i ∈ [n] with 1 6 Xi 6 2n for every i ∈ [n] and
∑n
i=1 Xi = n(n+ 1).
Question: Do there exist two permutations π and σ of [n] such that π(i) + σ(i) = Xi for
every i ∈ [n]?
We now prove that the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the Borda voting
rule, by a reduction from PERMUTATION SUM. Our reduction is inspired by the reduction
used by Davies et al. [DKNW11] and Betzler et al. [BNW11] to prove NP-completeness of
the COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION problem for the Borda voting rule.
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Theorem 1. The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the Borda voting rule.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce an arbitrary instance
of the PERMUTATION SUM problem to the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem for the Borda voting
rule. Let (X1, . . . ,Xn) be an instance of the PERMUTATION SUM problem. Without loss of
generality, let us assume that n is an odd integer – if n is an even integer, then we consider
the instance (X1, . . . ,Xn,Xn+1 = 2(n + 1)) which is clearly equivalent to the instance
(X1, . . . ,Xn).
We define a FRUGAL-BRIBERY instance (C,P,p) as follows. The candidate set is:
C = X ⊎D ⊎ {p, c}, where X = {xi : i ∈ [n]} and |D| = 3n− 1
Note that the total number of candidates is 4n + 1, and therefore the Borda score of a
candidate placed at the top position is 4n.
Before describing the votes, we give an informal overview of how the reduction will
proceed. The election that we define will consist of exactly two vulnerable votes. Note
that when placed at the top position in these two votes, the distinguished candidate p gets
a score of 8n (4n from each vulnerable vote). We will then add non-vulnerable votes,
which will be designed to ensure that, among them, the score of xi is 8n − Xi more than
the score of the candidate p. Using the “dummy candidates”, we will also be able to ensure
that the candidates xi receive (without loss of generality) scores between 1 and n from the
modified vulnerable votes.
Now suppose these two vulnerable votes can be modified to make p win the election.
Let s1 and s2 be the scores that xi obtains from these altered vulnerable votes. It is clear
that for p to emerge as a winner, s1 + s2 must be at most Xi. Since the Borda scores for
the candidates in X range from 1 to n in the altered vulnerable votes, the total Borda score
that all the candidates in X can accumulate from two altered vulnerable votes is n(n+ 1).
On the other hand, since the sum of the Xi’s is also n(n+1), it turns out that s1+s2 must in
fact be equal to Xi for the candidate p to win. From this point, it is straightforward to see
how the permutations σ and π can be inferred from the modified vulnerable votes: σ(i)
is given by the score of the candidate xi from the first vote, while π(i) is the score of the
candidate xi from the second vote. These functions turn out to be permutations because
these n candidates receive n distinct scores from these votes.
We are now ready to describe the construction formally. We remark that instead of 8n−
Xi, as described above, we will maintain a score difference of either 8n−Xi or 8n−Xi− 1
depending on whether Xi is even or odd respectively — this is a minor technicality that
comes from the manner in which the votes are constructed and does not affect the overall
spirit of the reduction.
Let us fix any arbitrary order ≻f among the candidates in X ⊎ D. For any subset A ⊂
X⊎D, let
−→
A be the ordering among the candidates in A as defined in ≻f and
←−
A the reverse
order of
−→
A . For each i ∈ [n], we add two votes vji and v
j′
i as follows for every j ∈ [4]. Let ℓ
denote |D| = 3n− 1. Also, for d ∈ D, let Di,Dℓ/2 ⊂ D \ {d} be such that:
|Di| = ℓ/2 + n+ 1− ⌈Xi/2⌉ and |Dℓ/2| = ℓ/2.
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vji :
{
c ≻ p ≻ d ≻
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
C \ ({d, c,p, xi} ⊎Di) ≻ xi ≻
−→
Di for 1 6 j 6 2
xi ≻
←−
Di ≻
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
C \ ({d, c,p, xi} ⊎Di) ≻ c ≻ p ≻ d for 3 6 j 6 4
vj
′
i :
{
c ≻ p ≻ d ≻
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
C \ ({d, c,p, xi} ⊎Dℓ/2) ≻ xi ≻
−−→
Dℓ/2 for 1 6 j
′ 6 2
xi ≻
←−−
Dℓ/2 ≻
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
C \ ({d, c,p, xi} ⊎Dℓ/2) ≻ c ≻ p ≻ d for 3 6 j
′ 6 4
It is convenient to view the votes corresponding to j = 3, 4 as a near-reversal of the
votes in j = 1, 2 (except for candidates c,d and xi). Let P1 = {v
j
i, v
j′
i : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [4]}. Since
there are 8n votes in all, and c always appears immediately before p, it follows that the
score of c is exactly 8n more than the score of the candidate p in P1.
We also observe that the score of the candidate xi is exactly 2(ℓ+n+ 1) −Xi = 8n−Xi
more than the score of the candidate p in P1 for every i ∈ [n] such that Xi is an even integer.
On the other hand, the score of the candidate xi is exactly 2(ℓ+n+1)−Xi−1 = 8n−Xi−1
more than the score of the candidate p in P1 for every i ∈ [n] such that Xi is an odd integer.
Note that for i′ ∈ [n] \ {i}, p and xi receive the same Borda score from the votes v
j
i′ and v
j′
i′
(where j, j′ ∈ [4]).
We now add the following two votes µ1 and µ2.
µ1 : p ≻ c ≻ others
µ2 : p ≻ c ≻ others
Let P = P1⊎{µ1,µ2},X
o = {xi : i ∈ [n],Xi is odd}, andX
e = X\Xo.We recall that the dis-
tinguished candidate is p. The tie-breaking rule is according to the order Xo ≻ p ≻ others.
We claim that the FRUGAL-BRIBERY instance (C,P,p) is equivalent to the PERMUTATION
SUM instance (X1, . . . ,Xn).
In the forward direction, suppose there exist two permutations π and σ of [n] such that
π(i) + σ(i) = Xi for every i ∈ [n]. We replace the votes µ1 and µ2 with respectively µ
′
1 and
µ′2 as follows.
µ′1 : p ≻ D ≻ xπ−1(n) ≻ xπ−1(n−1) ≻ · · · ≻ xπ−1(1) ≻ c
µ′2 : p ≻ D ≻ xσ−1(n) ≻ xσ−1(n−1) ≻ · · · ≻ xσ−1(1) ≻ c
We observe that, the candidates c and every x ∈ Xe receive same score as p, every
candidate x′ ∈ Xo receives 1 score less than p, and every candidate in D receives less score
than p in P1 ⊎ {µ
′
1,µ
′
2}. Hence p wins in P1 ⊎ {µ
′
1,µ
′
2} due to the tie-breaking rule. Thus
(C,P,p) is a YES instance of FRUGAL-BRIBERY.
To prove the other direction, suppose the FRUGAL-BRIBERY instance is a YES instance.
Notice that the only vulnerable votes are µ1 and µ2. Let µ
′
1 and µ
′
2 be two votes such that
the candidate p wins in the profile P1 ⊎ {µ
′
1,µ
′
2}. We assume, without loss of generality,
that candidate p is placed at the first position in both µ′1 and µ
′
2. Since c receives 8n scores
more than p in P1, cmust be placed at the last position in both µ
′
1 and µ
′
2 since otherwise p
cannot win in P1⊎ {µ
′
1,µ
′
2}.We also assume, without loss of generality, that every candidate
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in D is preferred over every candidate in X since otherwise, if x ≻ d in either µ′1 or µ
′
2 for
some x ∈ X and d ∈ D, then we can exchange the positions of x and d and p continues to
win since no candidate in D receives more score than p in P1. Hence, every x ∈ X receives
some score between 1 and n in both the µ′1 and µ
′
2. Let us define two permutations π and
σ of [n] as follows. For every i ∈ [n], we define π(i) and σ(i) to be the scores the candidate
xi receives in µ
′
1 and µ
′
2 respectively. The fact that π and σ, as defined above, is indeed
a permutation of [n] follows from the structure of the votes µ′1,µ
′
2 and the Borda score
vector. Since p wins in P1 ⊎ {µ
′
1,µ
′
2}, we have π(i)+σ(i) 6 Xi. We now have the following.
n(n + 1) =
n∑
i=1
(π(i) + σ(i)) 6
n∑
i=1
Xi = n(n + 1)
Hence, we have π(i)+σ(i) = Xi for every i ∈ [n] and thus (X1, . . . ,Xn) is a YES instance
of PERMUTATION SUM.
We will use Lemma 1 in subsequent proofs, which has been shown before (see, for
instance, the work of Baumeister et al. [BRR11] and Dey et al. [DMN16b]).
Lemma 1. Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} ⊎ D, (|D| > 0) be a set of candidates and
−→α a normalized
score vector of length |C|. Then, for any given X = (X1, . . . ,Xm) ∈ Z
m, there exists λ ∈ R
and a voting profile such that the −→α -score of ci is λ + Xi for all 1 6 i 6 m, and the score of
candidates d ∈ D is less than λ. Moreover, the number of votes is O(poly(|C| ·
∑m
i=1 |Xi|)),
where |Xi| is the absolute value of Xi.
Note that the number of votes used in Lemma 1 is polynomial in m if |D| and |Xi| are
polynomials in m for every i ∈ [m], which indeed is the case in all our proofs that use
Lemma 1. Hence, the reductions in the proofs that use Lemma 1 run in polynomial time.
We now show the results for various classes of scoring rules. To this end, we re-
duce from the EXACT-COVER-BY-3-SETS (X3C) problem, which is known to be NP-complete
[GJ79]. The X3C problem is defined as follows.
X3C
Input: A universe U and t subsets S1, . . . , St ⊂ U with |Si| = 3 ∀i ∈ [t].
Question: Does there exist an index set I ⊆ [t] with |I| = |U|/3 such that ⊎i∈ISi = U?
We denote an arbitrary instance of X3C by (U, {S1, . . . , St}).
Theorem 2. The FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the k-approval voting rule
for any constant k > 3, even if the price of every vulnerable vote is either 1 or∞.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce an arbitrary in-
stance of X3C to FRUGAL-$BRIBERY. Let (U, {S1, . . . , St}) be an instance of X3C. We define
a FRUGAL-$BRIBERY instance as follows. The candidate set is:
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C = U ⊎D ⊎ {p,q}, where |D| = k − 1
For each Si, 1 6 i 6 t, we add a vote vi as follows.
vi : Si ≻ D ≻ p ≻ q ≻ others
By Lemma 1, we can add poly(|U|) many additional votes to ensure the following
scores (denoted by s(·)).
– s(q) = s(p) + |U|/3
– s(x) = s(p) + |U|/3 + 1, ∀x ∈ U
– s(d) < s(p) − |U|, ∀d ∈ D
The tie-breaking rule is “p ≻ others”. The winner is q. The distinguished candidate
is p and thus all the votes in {vi : 1 6 i 6 t} are vulnerable. The price of every vi is 1
and the price of every other vulnerable vote is ∞. The budget is |U|/3. This completes the
construction. We now prove that the two instances are equivalent.
In the forward direction, let us suppose that there exists an index set I ⊆ [t] with
|I| = |U|/3 such that ⊎i∈ISi = U. We replace the votes vi with v
′
i, i ∈ I, which are defined as
follows.
v′i : p ≻ D︸ ︷︷ ︸
k candidates
≻ others
This makes the score of p not less than the score of any other candidate and thus p wins.
To prove the result in the other direction, let us suppose that the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY
instance is a YES instance. Then there exists V ⊂ {vi : 1 6 i 6 t} with |V| = |U|/3 such
that no vote in {vi : 1 6 i 6 t} \ V has been changed by the briber. Let the vote that
replaces v ∈ V be v′ and let V′ = {v′ : v ∈ V}. We assume, without loss of generality,
that the candidate p is placed within the first k positions of every vote v′ ∈ V′. Hence,
the final score of the candidate p is s(p) + |U|/3. We observe that, in every vote v′i ∈ V
′,
the candidate q and the corresponding Si should not be placed within the top k positions
since s(p) + |U|/3 = s(q) and s(p) + |U|/3 = s(x) − 1 for every x ∈ U. We claim that the Si’s
corresponding to the vi’s in V form an exact set cover. Indeed, otherwise, there will be a
candidate x ∈ U, whose score never decreases which contradicts the fact that p wins the
election since s(p) + |U|/3 = s(x) − 1.
We next present a similar result for the k-veto voting rule.
Theorem 3. The FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the k-veto voting rule for any
constant k > 3, even if the price of every vulnerable vote is either 1 or∞.
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Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce an arbitrary instance
of X3C to FRUGAL-$BRIBERY. Let (U, {S1, S2, . . . , St}) be any instance of X3C. We define a
FRUGAL-$BRIBERY instance as follows. The candidate set is:
C = U ⊎Q ⊎ {p,a1,a2,a3,d}, where |Q| = k− 3
For each Si, 1 6 i 6 t, we add a vote vi as follows.
vi : p ≻ others ≻ Si ≻ Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
k candidates
By Lemma 1, we can add poly(|U|) many additional votes to ensure following scores (de-
noted by s(·)).
– s(p) > s(d), s(p) = s(x) + 2, ∀x ∈ U
– s(p) = s(q) + 1, ∀q ∈ Q
– s(p) = s(ai) − |U|/3 + 1, ∀i = 1, 2, 3
The tie-breaking rule is “a1 ≻ · · · ≻ p”. The winner is a1. The distinguished candidate
is p and thus all the votes in {vi : 1 6 i 6 t} are vulnerable. The price of every vi is one
and the price of any other vote is∞. The budget is |U|/3. We claim that the two instances
are equivalent.
In the forward direction, suppose there exists an index set I ⊆ {1, . . . , t} with |I| = |U|/3
such that ⊎i∈ISi = U. We replace the votes vi with v
′
i, i ∈ I, which are defined as follows.
v′i : others ≻ a1 ≻ a2 ≻ a3 ≻ Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
k candidates
The score of each ai decreases by |U|/3 and their final scores are s(p)−1, since the score
of p is not affected by this change. Also the final score of each x ∈ U is s(p) − 1 since I
forms an exact set cover. This makes p win the election.
To prove the result in the other direction, suppose the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY instance is a
YES instance. Then, notice that there will be exactly |U|/3 votes in vi, 1 6 i 6 t, where
every aj, j = 1, 2, 3, should come in the last k positions since s(p) = s(aj)− |U|/3+1 and the
budget is |U|/3. Notice that candidates in Q must not be placed within top m − k positions
since s(p) = s(q) + 1, for every q ∈ Q. Hence, in the votes that have been changed,
a1,a2,a3 and all the candidates in Q must occupy the last k positions. We claim that the
Si’s corresponding to the vi’s that have been changed must form an exact set cover. If not,
then, there must exist a candidate x ∈ U and two votes vi and vj such that, both vi and
vj have been replaced by v
′
i 6= vi and v
′
j 6= vj and the candidate x was present within the
last k positions in both vi and vj. This makes the score of x at least the score of p which
contradicts the fact that p wins.
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We now show that there exists a polynomial time algorithm for the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY
problem for the k-approval, simplified Bucklin, and plurality with runoff voting rules, when
the budget is a constant. The result below follows from the existence of a polynomial
time algorithm for the COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION problem for these voting rules for any
number of manipulators [XZP+09].
Theorem 4. The FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is in P for the k-approval, simplified Bucklin,
and plurality with runoff voting rules, if the budget is a constant.
Proof. Let the budget b be a constant. Then, at most b many vulnerable votes whose price
is not zero can be changed since the prices are assumed to be in N. Notice that we may
assume, without loss of generality, that all the vulnerable votes whose price is zero will be
changed. We iterate over all the O(nb) many possible vulnerable vote changes and we can
solve each one in polynomial time since the COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION problem is in P
for these voting rules [XZP+09].
We show that the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for a wide class of scoring
rules as characterized in the following result.
Theorem 5. For any positional scoring rule r with score vectors {−→si : i ∈ N}, if there exists
a polynomial function f : N −→ N such that, for every m ∈ N, f(m) > 2m and in the score
vector (α1, . . . ,αf(m)), there exists a m 6 ℓ 6 f(m) − 5 satisfying the following condition:
αi − αi+1 = αi+1 − αi+2 > 0, ∀ℓ 6 i 6 ℓ+ 3
then the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for r even if the price of every vulnerable
vote is either 1 or∞.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce an arbitrary in-
stance of X3C to FRUGAL-$BRIBERY. Let (U, {S1, . . . , St}) be an instance of X3C. We define
a FRUGAL-$BRIBERY instance as follows. Let us consider the score vector (α1, . . . ,αf(|U|)).
Since the scoring rules remain unchanged if we multiply every αi by any constant λ > 0
and/or add any constant µ, we can assume the following without loss of generality.
αi − αi+1 = αi+1 − αi+2 = 1, ∀ℓ 6 i 6 ℓ+ 3
The candidate set is:
C = U ⊎Q ⊎ {p,a,d}, where |Q| = f(|U|) − |U| − 4 and Q = {q1,q2, . . . ,q|Q|}
Let us fix any arbitrary order ≻f among the candidates in U ⊎ Q. For any subset A ⊂
U ⊎ Q, let
−→
A be the ordering among the candidates in A as defined in ≻f . For each
Si = {x,y, z}, 1 6 i 6 t, we add a vote vi as follows.
vi : p ≻ d ≻
−−−−→
others ≻ a ≻ x ≻ y ≻ z ≻ q1 ≻ q2 ≻ · · · ≻ qf(|U|)−ℓ−4︸ ︷︷ ︸
l candidates
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By Lemma 1, we can add poly(|U|) many additional votes to ensure the following
scores (denoted by s(·)) in the resulting profile (including the votes vi, i ∈ [t]). Note that
the proof of Lemma 1 by Baumeister et al. [BRR11] also works for the normalization of α
defined in the beginning of the proof.
– s(d) < s(p)
– s(x) = s(p) − 2, ∀x ∈ U
– s(a) = s(p) + |U|/3 − 1
– s(q) = s(p) − 1, ∀q ∈ Q
The tie-breaking rule is “· · · ≻ p.” The candidate a wins. The distinguished candidate
is p. The price of every vi is 1 and the price of every other vulnerable vote is ∞. The
budget is |U|/3. We claim that the two instances are equivalent.
In the forward direction, there exists an index set I ⊆ [t], |I| = |U|/3, such that ⊎i∈ISi =
U. We replace the votes vi with v
′
i, i ∈ I, which are defined as follows.
v′i : p ≻ d ≻
−−−−→
others ≻ x ≻ y ≻ z ≻ a ≻ q1 ≻ q2 ≻ · · · ≻ qf(|U|)−ℓ−4
This makes the score of p at least one more than the score of every other candidate and
thus p wins.
To prove the result in the other direction, let us suppose that the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY
instance is a YES instance. Then there exists V ⊂ {vi : 1 6 i 6 t} with |V| = |U|/3 such that
no vote in {vi : 1 6 i 6 t} \ V has been changed by the briber. Let the vote that replaces
v ∈ V be v′ and let V′ = {v′ : v ∈ V}. Let the resulting profile be P′. We first claim that
the candidate qf(|U|)−ℓ−4 is placed at the last position of every v
′ ∈ V′. Indeed, otherwise
the score of the candidate qℓ−4 is not less than the score of p in P
′ which contradicts our
assumption that the candidate p wins in P′ since the tie-breaking rule is “· · · ≻ p.” Given
qf(|U|)−ℓ−4 is placed at the last position of every v
′ ∈ V′, we observe, by the same argument
applied for the candidate qf(|U|)−ℓ−5, that the candidate qf(|U|)−ℓ−5 is placed in the second
last position of every v′ ∈ V′. Arguing similarly all the way to the candidate q1 we observe
that the last (f(|U|) − ℓ − 4) positions of every v′ ∈ V′ will be q1 ≻ q2 ≻ · · · ≻ qf(|U|)−ℓ−4.
Since s(p) = s(a)− |U|/3+ 1 and the tie-breaking rule is “· · · ≻ p,” the candidate a must be
placed at the (l + 4)th position in every v′ ∈ V′. Hence, for every i ∈ [t] such that v′i ∈ V
′,
if Si = {x,y, z}, then the scores of the candidates x,y, and z increase by at least 1 each. We
claim that ∪i:v′i∈V′Si = U. If not, then there must exist a candidate x ∈ U whose score has
increased by at least 2 contradicting the fact that p wins in P′.
For the sake of concreteness, an example of a function f, stated in Theorem 5, that
works for the Borda voting rule is f(m) = 2m. Theorem 5 shows that the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY
problem is intractable for the Borda voting rule. However, the following theorem shows the
intractability of the UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem for the Borda voting rule, even
in a very restricted setting. Theorem 6 below is proved by a reduction from the COALITION
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MANIPULATION problem for the Borda voting rule for two manipulators which is known to
be NP-complete [BNW11, DKNW11].
Theorem 6. The UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the Borda voting
rule, even when every vulnerable vote has a price of 1 and the budget is 2.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce an arbitrary instance
of the COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION problem for the Borda voting rule with two manipula-
tors to an instance of the UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem for the Borda voting rule.
Let (C,≻t, 2,p) be an arbitrary instance of the COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION problem for
the Borda voting rule and |C| = m. The corresponding FRUGAL-$BRIBERY instance is as
follows. The candidate set is:
C′ = C ⊎ {d,q}
For each vote vi ∈≻
t, we add a vote v′i as follows.
v′i : vi ≻ d ≻ q
Let
−−−−→
C \ {p} is an arbitrary but fixed order of the candidates in C \ {p}. Corresponding to
the two manipulators’, we add two more votes ν1 and ν2 as follows.
ν1,ν2 :
−−−−→
C \ {p} ≻ d ≻ p ≻ q
Let s(·) and s′(·) be the score functions for the COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION and the
UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY instances respectively. We assume that s(x) < s(p)+ 2(m− 1)
for every x ∈ C \ {p} since otherwise the COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION instance is a trivial
NO instance. We now add more votes to ensure following score differences in the resulting
UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY instance.
s′(p) = λ+ s(p) − 2, s′(x) = λ+ s(x) for every x ∈ C \ {p},
s′(q) = s′(p) + 2m− 1, s′(p) > s′(d) + 2m for some λ ∈ Z
This will be achieved as follows. For any two arbitrary candidates a and b, the following
two votes increase the score of a by one more than the rest of the candidates except
b whose score increases by one less. This construction has been used before [XCP10,
DKNW11].
a ≻ b ≻
−−−−−−→
C \ {a,b}
←−−−−−−
C \ {a,b} ≻ a ≻ b
Also, we can ensure that candidate p is always in (m−1/2,m+1/2) positions and the
candidate q never immediately follows p in these new votes. The tie-breaking rule is
“q ≻ others ≻ p.” The candidate q is the winner since s′(q) = s′(p) + 2m − 1 > s′(x) for
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every x ∈ C′ \ {p,q}. The distinguished candidate is p. The price of every vulnerable vote
is one and the budget is two. We claim that the two instances are equivalent.
In the forward direction, suppose the COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION instance is a YES
instance. Let u1,u2 be the manipulators’ votes that make p win. In the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY
instance, we replace νi by ν
′
i : p ≻ d ≻ (ui \ {p}) ≻ q for i = 1, 2. This makes p win the
election.
In the reverse direction, recall that in all the vulnerable votes except ν1 and ν2, the
candidate q never immediately follows candidate p. Therefore, changing any of these
votes can never make p win the election since s′(q) = s′(p) − 2m + 1 and the budget is
two. Hence, the only way p can win the election, if at all possible, is by changing the votes
ν1 and ν2. Let a vote ν
′
i replaces νi for i = 1, 2. We can assume, without loss of generality,
that p and d are at the first and the second positions respectively in both ν′1 and ν
′
2. Let
ui be the order ν
′
i restricted only to the candidates in C. This makes p the unique winner
of the COALITIONAL-MANIPULATION instance since s′(p) = λ+ s(p) − 2, s′(x) = λ+ s(x) for
every x ∈ C and the tie-breaking rule is “q ≻ others ≻ p.”
4. Results for Weighted Elections
Now we turn our attention to weighted elections. As before, we begin with some easy
observations that follow from known results.
Observation 4. The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is in P for the maximin and the Copeland
voting rules for three candidates.
Proof. When we have 3 candidates, the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem is in P for
the maximin and the Copeland voting rules [CSL07]. Hence, the result follows from Propo-
sition 2.
Using the proof of Theorem 6 in Conitzer et al. [CSL07], we can obtain the following.
Observation 5. Assume we have only 3 candidates. Then the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is
NP-complete for every scoring rule except plurality.
Theorem 7. The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is in P for the plurality voting rule.
Proof. Let p be the distinguished candidate of the campaigner. We greedily replace every
vulnerable vote by the vote p ≻ others. The correctness follows from the fact that plurality
only accounts for candidates in the top position, and the strategy described is therefore the
best possible for candidate p.
Our hardness results in this section are based on the PARTITION problem, which is
known to be NP-complete [GJ79], and is defined as follows.
PARTITION
Input: A finite multi-setW of positive integers with
∑
w∈W w = 2K.
Question: Does there exist a subsetW′ ⊂W such that
∑
w∈W′ w = K?
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An arbitrary instance of PARTITION is denoted by (W, 2K). We define another problem
which we call 1
4
-PARTITION as below. We prove that 1
4
-PARTITION is also NP-complete. We
will use this fact in the proof of Theorem 10.
1
4
-PARTITION
Input: A finite multi-setW of positive integers with
∑
w∈W w = 4K.
Question: Does there exist a subsetW′ ⊂W such that
∑
w∈W′ w = K?
An arbitrary instance of 1
4
-PARTITION is denoted by (W, 4K).
Lemma 2. 1
4
-PARTITION problem is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce the PARTITION prob-
lem to it. Let (W, 2K) be an arbitrary instance of the PARTITION problem. We can assume,
without loss of generality, that 2K /∈ W, since otherwise the instance is trivially a no in-
stance. The corresponding 1
4
-PARTITION problem instance is defined by (W1, 4K), where
W1 = W ∪ {2K}. We claim that the two instances are equivalent. Suppose the PARTITION
instance is a YES instance and thus there exists a set W′ ⊂ W such that
∑
w∈W′ w = K.
This W′ gives a solution to the 1
4
-PARTITION instance. To prove the result in the other di-
rection, suppose there is a setW′ ⊂W1 such that
∑
w∈W′ w = K. This W
′ gives a solution
to the PARTITION problem instance since 2K /∈W′.
Our hardness reductions in this section have the following overall approach. We first
introduce vulnerable votes corresponding to the numbers in the instance of PARTITION,
and the weights and prices of these votes are tightly correlated with the corresponding
numbers in the PARTITION instance. We then introduce auxiliary votes, that are typically
not vulnerable, but are crafted in such a way that the distinguished candidate lags behind
the current winner — and the differential can only be compensated by changing exactly
half the weight of the vulnerable votes. In the case of FRUGAL-$BRIBERY, this is relatively
easy to achieve: the score difference can be used to create the requirement that the total
weight of the changed votes is at least K, while the budget can be used to enforce that
the total cost of the changed votes is at most K, which leads us naturally to the desired
partition. We see this in play in Theorem 8, for the plurality voting rule. For all the
other rules, since we don’t have costs, a more delicate argument is required to enforce the
two-sided dynamic of the affected votes.
In the rest of this section, we present the hardness results in weighted elections for the
following voting rules: plurality, maximin, STV, Copelandα, and simplified Bucklin. For
plurality, recall that the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is in P, and we will show that FRUGAL-
$BRIBERY is NP-complete. For all the other rules, we will establish that even FRUGAL-
BRIBERY is NP-complete.
Theorem 8. The FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the plurality voting rule for
three candidates.
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Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. We reduce an arbitrary instance of PARTITION to
an instance of FRUGAL-$BRIBERY for the plurality voting rule. Let (W, 2K), with W =
{w1, . . . ,wn} and
∑n
i=1wi = 2K, be an arbitrary instance of the PARTITION problem. In the
reduced instance, we introduce three candidates, namely, p,a, and b. The distinguished
candidate is p. We will now add votes in such a way that makes b win the election.
For every i ∈ [n], we have one vote a ≻ p ≻ b of both weight and price wi. We have
two votes b ≻ p ≻ a of weight 3K each (we do not need to define the price of this vote
since it is non-vulnerable). We also have one vote p ≻ a ≻ b of both weight and price
2K + 1. This finishes the description of the votes. We observe that candidate b wins the
plurality election with plurality score 3K. The tie-breaking rule is “a ≻ b ≻ p.” We define
the budget to be K. We claim that the two instances are equivalent.
In the forward direction, suppose there exists a W′ ⊂ W such that
∑
w∈W′ w = K. We
change the votes corresponding to the weights in W′ to p ≻ a ≻ b. This makes p win the
election with a plurality score of 3K+ 1.
To prove the other direction, for p to win, its score must increase by at least K. Also,
the prices ensure that p’s score can increase by at most K. Hence, p’s score must increase
by exactly by K and the only way to achieve this is to increase its score by changing the
votes corresponding to the weights in W. Thus, p can win only if there exists a W′ ⊂ W
such that
∑
w∈W′ w = K.
Next we show the hardness result for the maximin voting rule.
Theorem 9. The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the maximin voting rule for 4
candidates.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. We reduce an arbitrary instance of PARTITION to
an instance of FRUGAL-BRIBERY for the maximin voting rule. Let (W, 2K), with W =
{w1, . . . ,wn} and
∑n
i=1wi = 2K, be an arbitrary instance of the PARTITION problem. The
candidates in our FRUGAL-BRIBERY instance are p,a,b, and c. For every i ∈ [n], we have
one vote p ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c of weight wi. There is one vote c ≻ a ≻ b ≻ p, one vote
b ≻ c ≻ a ≻ p, and one vote a ≻ c ≻ b ≻ p each of weight K. The election is summarized
in Table 2. This finishes the description of the votes. The weighted majority graph induced
by these votes are shown in Figure 1. We observe that candidate a wins since it is the Con-
dorcet winner of the election. The tie-breaking rule is “p ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c.” The distinguished
candidate is p. Let T denote the set of votes corresponding to the weights in W and the
rest of the votes S. Notice that only the votes in T are vulnerable. We claim that the two
instances are equivalent.
23
Pairwise Outcomes a b c p
a — 4K 3K 3K
b K — 3K 3K
c 2K 2K — 3K
p 2K 2K 2K —
Pairwise Outcomes a b c p
a — 3K 2K 3K
b 2K — 3K 3K
c 3K 2K — 3K
p 2K 2K 2K —
Table 2: Every cell shows the number of voters who prefer the row candidate over the column candidate.
The left table shows the case of the reduced election in Theorem 9. The right table shows the case of the
modified election in the forward direction of the proof of Theorem 9. The green cells show the witness of
worst-case pairwise elections for every row candidate.
a
bc
p
K
K
K
K
K
3K
Figure 1: Weighted majority graph of the reduced instance in Theorem 9.
In the forward direction, suppose there exists a W′ ⊂ W such that
∑
w∈W′ w = K. We
keep the votes corresponding to the weights inW′ same as the original vote p ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c.
We change the rest of the votes in T to p ≻ b ≻ c ≻ a. We observe from the weighted
majority graph (shown in Figure 2) induced by these new set of votes that the maximin
score of every candidate is −K and thus due to the tie-breaking rule, p wins the election.
a
bc
p
K
K
K
K
K
K
Figure 2: Weighted majority graph induced by the votes in the forward direction of the proof of Theorem 9.
To prove the result in the other direction, suppose there is a way to change the vul-
nerable votes, that is the votes in T , that makes p win the election. Let the new set of
votes that replace T be T ′. Without loss of generality, we can assume that all the votes in
T ′ place p at the first position. Hence the maximin score of candidate p is −K. We first
notice that the only way p could win is that the vertices a,b, and c must form a cycle in
the weighted majority graph. Otherwise, one of a,b, and c will be a Condorcet winner and
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thus the winner of the election. We also observe that the weight of every edge of the cycle
consisting of a,b, and c only must be at least K. If not, then the maximin score of one of
candidates in {a,b, c}must be strictly more than −K. This contradicts our assumption that
p wins since the maximin score of candidate p is fixed at −K.
Now, we claim that candidate b must defeat candidate c. Suppose not. Then, since the
maximin score of p is fixed at −K, c must defeat b by a margin of at least K. Further, note
that the margin must be exactly K since making c defeat b by a margin K requires c to be
preferred over b in every vote in T ′. On the other hand, a must defeat c by a margin of
at least K (and thus exactly K), otherwise the maximin score of c will be more than −K.
This implies that all the votes in T ′ must be p ≻ a ≻ c ≻ b which makes a defeat b. This
is a contradiction since the vertices a,b, and c must form a cycle in the weighted majority
graph. Hence b must defeat c by a margin of K.
Since b defeats c by a margin of K, every vote in T ′ is forced to prefer b over c. Without
loss of generality, we assume that all the votes in T ′ are either p ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c or p ≻
b ≻ c ≻ a, since whenever c is immediately after a, we can swap a and c and this will
only reduce the score of a without affecting the score of any other candidates. If the total
weight of the votes p ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c in T ′ is more than K, then DE(c,a) < K, thereby making
the maximin score of a more than the maximin score of p. If the total weight of the votes
p ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c in T ′ is less than K, then DE(a,b) < K, thereby making the maximin score
of b more than the maximin score of p. Thus the total weight of the votes p ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c
in T ′ should be exactly K which corresponds to a partition ofW.
We now prove the hardness result for the STV voting rule.
Theorem 10. The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the STV voting rule for 3
candidates.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. We reduce an arbitrary instance of 1
4
-PARTITION to an
instance of FRUGAL-BRIBERY for the STV voting rule. Let (W, 4K), with W = {w1, . . . ,wn}
and
∑n
i=1wi = 4K, be an arbitrary instance of the
1
4
-PARTITION problem. The candidates in
our FRUGAL-BRIBERY instance are p,a, and b. For every i ∈ [n], we have a vote p ≻ a ≻ b
of weight wi. We have one vote a ≻ p ≻ b of weight 3K − 1 and one vote b ≻ a ≻ p
of weight 2K. This finishes the description of the votes. The tie-breaking rule is “a ≻
b ≻ p.” We observe that the plurality score of candidates a,b, and p are 3K − 1, 2K, and
4K respectively in the resulting election. Hence candidate b gets eliminated in the first
round. In the second round, the plurality score of candidates a and p are 5K − 1 and 4K
respectively. Hence candidate a wins the STV election. The distinguished candidate is p.
Let T denote the set of votes corresponding to the weights in W and the rest of the votes
be S. Notice that only the votes in T are vulnerable. We claim that the two instances are
equivalent.
In the forward direction, suppose there exists a W′ ⊂ W such that
∑
w∈W′ w = K. We
change the votes corresponding to the weights in W′ to b ≻ p ≻ a. We do not change
the rest of the votes in T . In the first round of the resulting profile, candidates a,b, and
p receive a plurality score of 3K − 1, 3K, and 3K respectively. Hence candidate a gets
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eliminated in the first round. In the second round, candidates b and p receive a plurality
score of 3K and 6K− 1 respectively and thus candidate p wins the election.
For the other direction, suppose there is a way to change the votes in T that makes p
win the election. We first observe that candidate p can win only if p and b qualifies for
the second round. Hence, the total weight of the votes in T that put b at the first position
must be at least K. On the other hand, if the total weight of the votes in T that put b at
the first position is strictly more than K, then p does not qualify for the second round and
thus cannot win the election. Hence the total weight of the votes in T that put b at the first
position must be exactly equal to K which constitutes a 1
4
-partition ofW.
For three candidates, the STV voting rule is the same as the plurality with runoff voting
rule. Hence, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the plurality with runoff vot-
ing rule for 3 candidates.
We turn our attention to the Copelandα voting rule next.
Theorem 11. The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the Copelandα voting rule
for 4 candidates for every α ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. We reduce an arbitrary instance of PARTITION to
an instance of FRUGAL-BRIBERY for the Copelandα voting rule. Let (W, 2K), with W =
{w1, . . . ,wn} and
∑n
i=1wi = 2K, be an arbitrary instance of the PARTITION problem. The
candidates in our FRUGAL-BRIBERY instance are p,a,b, and c. For every i ∈ [n], we have a
vote p ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c of weight wi. There are two votes a ≻ p ≻ b ≻ c and c ≻ b ≻ a ≻ p
each of weight K + 1. This finishes the description of the votes. The tie-breaking rule
is “a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ p.” The weighted majority graph induced by these votes are shown
in Figure 3. We observe that candidate a wins since it is the Condorcet winner of the
election. The distinguished candidate is p. Let T denote the set of votes corresponding
to the weights in W and the rest of the votes be S. Notice that only the votes in T are
vulnerable. We claim that the two instances are equivalent.
Pairwise
Outcomes
a b c p
a — 3K+ 1 3K+ 1 2K+ 2
b K+ 1 — 3K+ 1 K+ 1
c K+ 1 K+ 1 — K+ 1
p 2K 3K+ 1 3K+ 1 —
Pairwise
Outcomes
a b c p
a — K+ 1 K+ 1 2K+ 2
b 3K+ 1 — 2K+ 1 K+ 1
c 3K+ 1 2K+ 1 — K+ 1
p 2K 3K+ 1 3K+ 1 —
Table 3: Every cell shows the number of voters who prefer the row candidate over the column candidate.
The left table shows the case of the reduced election in Theorem 11. The right table shows the case of
the modified election in the forward direction of the proof of Theorem 11. Green cells indicate that the
row candidate defeats the column candidate in pairwise election. Yellow cells indicate that the row and the
column candidate are tied in pairwise election.
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abc
p
2
2K
2K
2K
2K
2K
Figure 3: Weighted majority graph of the reduced instance in Theorem 11.
In the forward direction, suppose there exists a W′ ⊂ W such that
∑
w∈W′ w = K. We
change the votes corresponding to the weights inW′ to p ≻ c ≻ b ≻ a. We change the rest
of the votes in T to p ≻ b ≻ c ≻ a. We observe from the weighted majority graph (shown
in Figure 4) induced by these new set of votes that the Copelandα score of of candidate
p is 2 and the Copelandα score of every other candidate is strictly less than 2. Hence,
candidate p wins the election.
a
bc
p
2
2K
2K
2K
2K
Figure 4: Weighted majority graph induced by the votes in the forward direction of the proof of Theorem 11.
For the other direction, suppose there is a way to change the votes in T that makes p
win the election. Let the new set of votes that replace T be T ′. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that all the votes in T ′ place p at the top position. We claim that one of the
three pairwise elections among a,b, and c must be a tie. Suppose not, then a must lose
to both b and c, otherwise a wins the election due to the tie-breaking rule. Now consider
the pairwise election between b and c. If b defeats c, then b wins the election due to the
tie-breaking rule. If c defeats b, then c wins the election again due to the tie-breaking
rule. Hence, one of the pairwise elections among a,b, and c must be a tie. Without loss of
generality suppose a and b ties. However, then the total weight of the votes that prefer a
to b in T ′ must be K which constitutes a partition ofW.
Finally, we show that the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem for the simplified Bucklin voting
rule is NP-complete.
Theorem 12. The FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the simplified Bucklin voting
rule for 4 candidates.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. We reduce an arbitrary instance of PARTITION to
an instance of FRUGAL-BRIBERY for the simplified Bucklin voting rule. Let (W, 2K), with
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W = {w1, . . . ,wn} and
∑n
i=1wi = 2K, be an arbitrary instance of the PARTITION problem.
The candidates in our FRUGAL-BRIBERY instance are p,a,b, and c. For every i ∈ [n], we
have one vote p ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c of weight wi. There are two votes a ≻ b ≻ p ≻ c
and c ≻ b ≻ a ≻ p each of weight K. This finishes the description of the votes. The
tie-breaking rule is “p ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c.” Observe that:
– The candidates a and b get majority within the first two positions .
– The candidate p does not get majority within the first two positions.
– No candidate gets majority within the first position.
Therefore, candidate a wins due to the tie-breaking rule. We set the distinguished
candidate as p. Let T denote the set of votes corresponding to the weights in W and the
rest of the votes be S. Notice that only the votes in T are vulnerable. We claim that the
two instances are equivalent.
In the forward direction, suppose there exists a W′ ⊂ W such that
∑
w∈W′ w = K. We
change the votes corresponding to the weights inW′ to p ≻ c ≻ b ≻ a. We keep the votes
corresponding to the weights inW \W′ same as the original ones. Now no candidate gets
majority within first two positions and candidate p gets majority within first two positions.
This makes p win the election with a simplified Bucklin score of 3 due to the tie-breaking
rule.
To prove the result in the other direction, suppose there is a way to change the votes in
T that makes p win the election. Let the new set of votes that replace T be T ′. Without loss
of generality, we can assume that all the votes in T ′ place p at the first position. We first
notice that the simplified Bucklin score of p is already fixed at three. In the votes in T ′,
candidate b can never be placed at the second position since that will make the simplified
Bucklin score of b to be two. Also the total weight of the votes in T ′ that place a in their
second position can be at most K. The same holds for c. Hence, the total weight of the
votes that place a in their second position will be exactly equal to K which constitutes a
partition ofW.
From Proposition 1, Observation 5, Theorem 8 to 12, and Corollary 1, we get the
following.
Corollary 2. When we have 3 candidates, the UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY and the
NONUNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problems are NP-complete for the scoring rules except plu-
rality, STV, and the plurality with runoff voting rules. When we have 4 candidates, the
UNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY and the NONUNIFORM-FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problems are NP-
complete for the maximin, Copeland, and simplified Bucklin voting rules.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
We have proposed and studied two important special cases of the $BRIBERY problem
where the briber is frugal. We have shown that the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem can some-
times be polynomial time solvable even if the $BRIBERY and the SWAP-BRIBERY problems
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are NP-complete as observed for the k-approval and the k-veto voting rules for unweighted
elections. This establishes success in finding important practical special cases of the sophis-
ticated $BRIBERY and SWAP-BRIBERY problems. We also proved that the FRUGAL-BRIBERY
problem is NP-complete for the Borda voting rule and the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem is
NP-complete for all the voting rules studied here except the plurality and the veto voting
rules for unweighted elections. The intractability results of the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY prob-
lem and the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem thereby subsumes and strengthens the hardness
results for the $BRIBERY problem. For the weighted election, we have shown that the sim-
plest FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem also is NP-complete for all the voting rule studied in this
paper except for the plurality voting rule even when the number of candidates is as small
as 3 or 4. We find these results in the weighted elections both surprising and interesting.
An immediate future work is to resolve the open cases in Table 1. Another important
direction for future work is to study these problems under various other settings. No-
tably, one might consider enhancing our proposed model further to account for constraints
that arise in practical scenarios. For instance, we might want to restrict the campaigner’s
knowledge about the votes and/or the candidates who will actually turn up. The uncer-
tainty can also arise from the voting rule that will eventually be used among a set of voting
rules. Also, studying these problems when the pricing model for vulnerable votes is similar
to swap bribery would be another interesting future direction. We believe that a game
theoretic perspective of the problem may also yield valuable insights.
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